The concept of semivalue of a transferable utility game has been introduced by Dubey, Neyman and Weber as weighted sum of marginal contributions. Later, Puente has introduced a particular class of semivalues, called binomial semivalues, where weights are obtained through a recursive procedure. In the present paper, we extend Puente's procedure to obtain an equivalent representation of semivalues that turns out to be useful to solve the inverse problem and the question of coalitional rationality.
Introduction
A transferable utility game specifies who are the players and what they can achieve when they form coalitions. If there is a potential gain for the players to get together and cooperate, the question that comes up immediately is how to divide this gain, that is how to remunerate the players for their participation to the collective endeavor.
In 1953, Lloyd Shapley introduced axiomatically the notion of value of a transferable utility game that specifies a rule for distributing the gain that the "grand coalition" can generate.
A natural question is then the following: Given an allocation, can we identify the set of games whose Shapley value coincides with that allocation? This is the inverse problem that has first been addressed by Kleinberg and Weiss (1985) and Dragan (1991) .
"At the foundation of the theory of games is the assumption that a player can evaluate in terms of his utility scale every situation that can result from a play of a game." This quotation from Shapley (1951) indicates that the concept of value was initially intended to answer the question of what a player may reasonably expect from playing a game. That point of view raises the question of efficiency: Are players' evaluations consistent? By requiring that the total gain be exactly allocated among the players, the Shapley value is actually efficient. Dropping efficiency opens the way to other classes of value, among which the semivalues introduced by Dubey, Neyman and Weber (1981) . A semivalue allocates to players a weighted sum of their (marginal) contributions to coalitions. The weights only depend on coalition size and define a particular semivalue. The Shapley value happens to be the only efficient semivalue. The Banzhaf value is another well-known semivalue derived from the power index introduced by Banzhaf (1965) . The inverse problem for the Banzhaf value has been addressed by Dragan (1996) and, later, for semivalues, by Dragan (2005) .
The core introduced by Gillies (1953) is an other game theoretic concept that applies to transferable utility games. The core of a game is the set of efficient allocations such that no coalition globally receives an amount short of what it is worth. This is the question of coalitional rationality. Games often cover situations where it is impossible to satisfy all coalitions i.e. the core of a game may be empty. Furthermore, it carries no value judgment and therefore, when nonempty, it may contain unfair allocations: Coalitional rationality and fairness may be mutually inconsistent. For a given set of weights, looking at the set of games whose semivalue coincides with a particular allocation, we may ask whether there are games for which that allocation belongs to their cores. As such, that question makes sense only if efficiency applies.
It has been addressed for the Shapley value by Izawa and Takahashi (1998) . If instead efficiency does not apply, coalitional rationality is analyzed with respect to the core of an auxiliary game, the power game, a concept introduced by Dragan (1996) in relation to the Banzhaf value. Dragan and Martinez-Legaz (2001) have later generalized the analysis to semivalues. In the present paper, we reconsider the solution to the inverse problem for semivalues and the associated question of coalitional rationality, using an equivalent representation of semivalues inspired by the concept of binomial semivalue introduced by Puente (2000) . 1 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces semivalues and their equivalent representation. Section 3 revisits the solution of the inverse problem using the notion of potential. Section 4 addresses the question of coalitional rationality. The last section offers concluding remarks.
Semivalues
A transferable utility game (hereafter "game") is a pair ( , ) Nv where {1,..., } Nn  is a set of players and v is a set function (a "characteristic function") that associates a real number () vS to each subset (coalition) S of N. () vS is the worth of coalition S, the best it can obtain by itself. By convention ( ) 0.
v  We denote by G the set of all games. A characteristic function on a set N is defined by 2 n -1 numbers. Hence, the set () GN of games on a player set N can be identified to the Euclidian space 21 .
Notation: Set inclusion is denoted by  and strict inclusion by . Upper-case letters denote finite sets and the corresponding lower-case letters denote their sizes:
For a given coalition S, \
Si denotes the coalition obtained by removing player i from coalition S. For a coalition T,
denotes the collection of subsets of T containing player i.
We occasionally drop the braces to denote coalitions and omit the index set in summations when no confusion may arise.
The allocation of () vN  the worth of the "grand coalition"  among the players is the central question addressed by the theory of cooperative games. A payoff vector n x  specifies a payoff for each player, i x for player i. We will consider the following three properties of payoff vectors:
Coalitional rationality:
( ) for all .  to every game ( , ) . Nv Semivalues form a family of values 1 The inverse problem for binomial semivalues has been addressed by Dragan (2014) . 2 For more details on transferable utility games, see for instance Owen (1995) or Maschler et al. (2013) . Formally a game is a pair (N,v) . When N is known, a game is identified with its characteristic function.
introduced by Dubey, Neyman and Weber (1981) as mappings satisfying the following four properties:
These four properties define semivalues as weighted average of marginal contributions:
The weights only depend on coalition size and are given by:
where  is a probability measure on the interval [0,1]. The interpretation is the following. Given a player i, pick t at random according to the probability distribution defined by the measure  and let players independently join player i with probability t. Coalition S containing player i then forms with probability 1 (1 ) . Dubey, Neyman and Weber (1981) prove that the weight vector ( (1),..., ( )) n n n p p p n  can be any nonnegative vector satisfying the following normalization condition:
 is the number of coalition of size s containing a given player. In an additive game, all players are dummies. Hence, for all weight systems n p satisfying (2),
Nv is additive.
As far as terminology is concerned, for a given player set, weights define a particular semivalue and that semivalue associates payoff vectors to games. There are two well-known semivalues. The Shapley value is the semivalue defined by: 3
The Banzhaf value is the semivalue defined by 1 ( ) 1/ 2 ( 1,..., ). 
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A semivalue defined on a game ( , ) Nv by weights n p induces semivalues on the t-player subgames ( , ) T Tv obtained by restricting the characteristic function v to subsets
. ST  From now on, we drop the subscript T : ( , ) Tv will denote the subgame on the subset T. The corresponding weights are given by the inverse Pascal triangle formula:
If n p satisfies the normalization condition (2), the weights t p derived from (3) automatically satisfy the normalization condition for all 1,..., 1. tn  In the 3-player case, the normalization condition reads 3 3 3
(1) 2 (2) The binomial semivalue of a game ( , ) Nv associated to p is therefore given by:
Banzhaf value corresponds to the case where p = 1/2. (1) , (2) , ..., ( ) ...
In terms of the s  normalization condition then reads:
This gives rise to an equivalent formulation of semivalues:
This equivalent formulation will be especially useful in solving coalitional rationality. 4 Assuming 0 0 = 1.
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For 3-player games, (4) becomes 3 
Given N and , Li v i L  Notice that, at this stage, non-negativity of L is not imposed. Payoffs will be assumed to have nonnegative components when discussing coalitional rationality.
The potential basis
The potential of a game relative to the Shapley value has been introduced by Mas-Colell (1988, 1989) . More generally, a potential relative to a value  is a function :
such that a player's payoff according to  is equal to his marginal contribution to the grand coalition computed in terms of :
The potential of a game, relative to a semivalue, has been introduced by Dragan (1996) and by Calvo and Santos (1997) as follows. Consider the game ( , ) Nv and the semivalue associated to the weight vector . n p
The potential of the subgame ( , ) Tv is then given by:
where the weights t p of the subgames are derived by the inverse Pascal triangle rule. Indeed, using (1) and (3), we have:
The most popular bases of the vector space of games on a given set of players are the standard basis and the unanimity basis. The latter was used by Shapley to prove the unicity of his value. The concept of potential may be used to define another basis as shown by Dragan 
where the weights t p of the subgames are obtained from (3). In words, the coordinate T of v relative to this basis is the potential of the subgame ( , ). Tv Dragan (2005) proves the following important theorem that specifies the potential basis associated to a given weight system. We observe that {} T w defines a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are given by ( ) 1/ ( ).
Tt w T p t 
Hence, it is a regular matrix and consequently () T w is a basis of G(N). We denote it by ( ). n Wp It will be used to solve the inverse problem. Notice that the weights that appear in the formulation of the basis are all of the form 1/ ( ). t pt The potential basis for the 3player case is given by Table 1. The following theorem specifies the semivalues of the games that are part of the potential basis. Proof For a given player i in S and coalition T in N, we apply (9) to get:
where P is the potential defined by (8) 
Solution to the inverse problem
The following theorem gives a solution to the inverse problem. It characterizes the set ( , , ) n G N L p defined by (7). Theorem 3.3 The games in ( , , ) n G N L p are of the following form:
where and the NT  are 2 -1 n n  arbitrary constants.
Proof Assume that (11) holds. By linearity of the operator SE and Theorem 3.2, we have:
Conversely, by Theorem 3.1 and (10) We observe that the games defined by (11) 
For the Shapley weights 3 (1/3,1/6,1/3) p  and 2 (1/2,1/2), p  the game defined in (12) becomes: (1/2,1/2), p  it turns out that, with three players, only the worth of the grand coalition changes:
Coalitional rationality
The payoffs defined by a semivalue may fail to satisfy some or all of the following properties, efficiency, individual rationality and coalitional rationality. Given a player set N and weights , n p consider an arbitrary payoff vector L. Question: Can we identify games in ( , , ) n G N L p such that L satisfies some or all of the above properties relative to these games? There is a trivial answer: The additive game ( , ) L Nv satisfies all three properties, independently of the weights. However, we are interested in non-additive games. Individual rationality is no problem. It suffices to impose ii L   for all i in (11). Coalitional rationality instead is a problem. When efficiency holds, the question of coalitional rationality can be raised directly, while in the absence of efficiency, we need an appropriate redefinition of coalitional rationality.
The family of almost null games
From now on, we assume that
To solve the question of coalitional rationality, consider the subsets of games in ( , , ) n G N L p defined by 0 T   for all coalition T of size 2 tn  in (11). They are of the following form: 
They are verified in the case of the Shapley value. We will see later that, in the 3-player case, they define uniquely the Shapley value, together with the normalization condition (5). From (15), we obtain the following game: 
If instead efficiency does not apply, coalitional rationality is evaluated with respect to the power game associated to a semivalue. The power game associated to a game ( , ) Nv and weights n p is the game ( , )
where the intermediary weights t p are derived from (3) 
Therefore, the same inequality, namely (18), guarantees coalitional rationality in the absence of efficiency. The following theorem summarizes our findings, knowing that the definition of coalitional rationality depends on efficiency. (17) are such that ( , ) . SV N u L   Furthermore, for  satisfying (18), L belongs to the core of the game ( , )
Nu  and thereby L satisfies coalitional rationality.
Example 4.1 Consider the 4-player case, with the payoff vector L = (3, 5, 9, 13) and the weights
(1/10, 2/15,1/12,1/4). n p  The corresponding s  are given by (1/10, 4/3, 5/8, 3) .
 
The weights satisfy (16) and therefore efficiency holds and the game ( , ) Nu  defined in (17) is then given by:
(1, 2,3) 3 ( 13) (1, 2, 4) 3 ( 9) (1,3, 4) 3 ( 5) (2,3, 4) 3 ( 3) (1, 2,3, 4) 30 8, 1, 1, 1) .
The game ( , ) Nv  defined in (15) is then given by:
(1, 2,3) 4 ( 13) (1, 2, 4) 4 ( 9) (1,3, 4) 4( 5)
(2,3, 4) 4( 3)
(1, 2,3, 4) 4( 30 2  
The 3-player case
The case where n = 3 is of a particular interest and deserves to be treated apart. Furthermore, because  satisfies (18), L belongs to the core of the game ( , ) .
Nu This is a particularity of 3-player games that does not carry over to a larger n. In the 4-player case, with (1, 2,3) 7
(1, 2, 4) 9
(1,3, 4) 25
(2,3, 4) 33
(1, 2,3, 4) 30 
Concluding remarks
The quest for games that reproduce any given nonnegative payoff vector that belongs to their cores can be used to answer the following question: How to modify a game with an empty core in such a way that its Shapley value satisfies coalitional rationality. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 5.1 Consider the 3-player simple majority game defined by (1) (2) (3) 0 (1, 2) (1,3) (2,3) 1
This game has an empty core. It is a symmetric game and therefore the Shapley value is the egalitarian payoff that allocates 1/3 to each player. With Shapley weights, the games in the family of almost null games are given by (13): (1) (2) to satisfy (18), we obtain the following game:
(1) (2) Its core is nonempty and reduces to the singleton (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Semivalues are symmetric in the sense that players contributing identically to coalitions obtain the same amount. The inverse problem for efficient and asymmetric values has been addressed by Dragan (2012) . Asymmetric values include the weighted Shapley values, random order values and values derived from arbitrary distributions of Harsanyi dividends. 6 The related question of coalitional rationality will be the object of further research.
